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L Facts
In February 1983, GregoryEsparza ("Esparza") entered a store in Toledo,
Ohio. At gunpoint, he ordered Melanie Gerschultz ("Gerschultz") to open the
cash register. Simultaneously, James Barailloux ("Barailloux") escaped through
a rear door in the store and alerted the store owner, Evelyn Krieger ("Krieger").
While alerting Krieger to the robbery of the store, Barailloux heard a gunshot.
Barailloux and Krieger returned to the store and discovered Gerschultz fatally
wounded on the floor and approximately $110 missing from the cash register.'
Esparza was charged with and convicted of "aggravated murder during the
commission of an aggravated robbery."2 The jury recommended a sentence of
death for the murder conviction and the trial judge accepted this recommenda-
tion.3 Additionally, the trial judge "sentenced [Esparza] to 7 to 25 years' impris-
onment for aggravated robbery, plus 3 years for the firearm specification."4 The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Esparza's convictions and sentences.'
During state post-conviction review, E sparza argued "for the first time, that
he had not been convicted of an offense for which a death sentence could be
imposed under Ohio law."6 The indictment charged Esparza with aggravated
murder in the commission of an aggravated robbery but failed to charge him as
a "principal offender" as required under Ohio law.7 Holding that literal statutory
compliance was unnecessary, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected this claim'
1. Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7, 9 (2003) (per curiam).
2. Id; sm OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 2903.01 (Anderson 2003) (defining the crime of
aggravated murder); OHIOREv. CODE ANN. 2911.01 (Anderson Supp. 2003) (defining the crime
of aggravated robbery).
3. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. at 9; se OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 2002)
(providing that "[i]f the trial jury unanimously finds, byproof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating
factors, the trial jury shall mwmmd to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the
offender" (emphasis added)).
4. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. at 9.
5. State v. Esparza, 529 N.E.2d 192, 200 (Ohio 1988).
6. Espaza, 124 S. Ct. at 9.
7. Id; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(7) (Anderson 1997) (providing in part that
"[imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless ... [t]he offense was
committed" while attempting aggravated robbery "and either the offender was the principal
offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed
the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design").
8. Esprrza, 124 S. Ct. at 10. The court further stated that "where only one defendant is
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Esparza then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief.9 In this petition,
Esparza alleged, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective for not
arguing "that the State's failure to complywith its sentencing procedures violated
the Eighth Amendment."" The Ohio Court of Appeals denied this clainL"
According to the court's decision, Esparza "failed to prove he was prejudiced
because any error committed by counsel was harmless." 2
After exhausting state avenues for relief, Esparza filed a federal habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 3
The district court granted Esparza's "petition in part and issued a writ of habeas
corpus as to the death sentence." 4 The court determined "that the Ohio Court
of Appeals s] decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established
federallaw."l Further, the district court concluded that the state court's decision
was contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in Apprei u NewJeseJ/ and
Sulli=n v Luisiana. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision and held that "the Eighth Amendment
precluded [Esparza's] death sentence and that harmless-error reviewwas inappro-
priate." s The United States Supreme Court granted Ohio's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 9
named in an indictment alleging felony murder, it would be redundant to state that the defendant
is being charged as the principal offender. Onlywhere more than one defendant is named need the
indictment specify the allegation 'principal offender.'" State v. Esparza, No. L-90-235, 1992 WL
113827, at *1,*9 (Ohio Ct. App. May29, 1992).
9. Esp _.a, 124 S. Cat. at 10.
10. Id
11. Id; seeState v. Esparza, No. L 84-225, 1994 WL 395114, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27,
1994) (denying post-conviction relief).
12. Es/ara, 124 S. Ct. at 10. On brief to the United States Supreme Court, Esparza
maintained that the Ohio court concluded that because he was the sole individual charged with




16. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
17. Espzza, 124 S. Ct. at 10;swApprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) (holding
that except for por convictions "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt"); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,281 (1993) (stating that" 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the
burden of proof, which vitiates a/! the jury's findings").
18. Esparza, 124 S. C. at 10.




The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth
Circuit and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its
opinion. ° 'Me Court concluded that "the Sixth Circuit exceeded its authority
under S 2254(d)(1)" when it held "that harmless-error review is not available for
this type of Eighth Amendment claim," and it failed to rely on precedent in
reaching its decision. 2' Further, the Court held that the Ohio Court of Appeals's
determination was not an 'unreasonable appliaticmn of clearlyestablished Federal
law.' "22
XI. A ndss
In order for a federal court to grant a state habeas petitioner relief for a
claim that was adjudicated in state court on the merits, the adjudication must
have" 'resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.' "23 For a state court decision to be "contrary to"
clearly established Federal law, it must apply a rule that is contradictory to the
governing law set forth bythe United States Supreme Court or address a set of
facts that is indistinguishable from a decision of the United States Supreme Court
but not withstanding, arrive at a different result than that of the precedent.24 The
Sixth Circuit neglected to cite or apply 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1).2 Moreover, a
state court's decision is not" 'contrary to... clearly established Federal law' "
merely as a result of failure to cite Supreme Court precedent.26 The state court
does not even need to be aware that Supreme Court precedent exist" 'so long
as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts
thenI' "127
The Sixth Circuit stated that Ohio's failure to charge Esparza as "a 'princi-
pal' was the functional equivalent of 'dispensing with the reasonable doubt
requirement."' 28 The Supreme Court held that its precedent did not support this
20. Id at 12.
21. Idat 11.
22. Id at 12 (quoting 28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
23. Id at 10 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1)); see 28 U.S.c S 2254(d)(1) (limiting a federal
court's abiliryto issue writs of habeas corpus with respect to state court decisions; part of AEDPA).
24. 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d)(1); serWilliarns v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,405-06 (2000) (interpreting
the meaning of "contrary to clearly established Federal law").
25. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. at 10.
26. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C S2254(d)(1)); sw Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.
3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (stating that a state court's failure to cite Supreme Court precedent does
not make the state court's decision contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent).
27. Esparza, 124 S. C. at 10 (quoting Eardy 537 U.S. at 8).
28. Id at 11 (quoting Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2002)).
2004]
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conclusion.29 "In noncapital cases, [the Supreme Court has] often held that the
trial court's failure to instruct a jury on all of the statutoryelements of an offense
is subject to harmless-error analysis."3" The Court distinguished Sulliwn from
Nederv UnitEdSta & bystating that the error in Sulliwtnof failing "to instruct the
jury that the State must prove the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt- 'vitiate[d] all the jury's findings,'" whereas the error in Ner, failing to
instruct the jury on a single element of the offense, did not." The Court rea-
soned that merely because the omission in this case occurred in the capital
context, Supreme Court precedent set forth in cases like Nader did not dictate a
contradictoryresult." "Where the jurywas precluded from determining onlyone
element of an offense, [the Court] held that harmless-error review is feasible."34
The Court held that the Sixth Circuit exceeded its authority under S
2254(d) (1) by relying on the absence of precedent in the capital context and by
determining that harmless-error review was not "available for this type of Eighth
Amendment claim."3" Because a federal court is precluded from overruling a
state court for reaching a result contraryto the result that the federal court might
itself have reached regarding an issue about which Supreme Court precedent is
"at best, ambiguous," the Ohio Court of Appeals's decision was not" 'contrary
to ... clearly established Federal law.' "36
The Court further held that the Ohio Court of Appeals's decision was not
an" 'unreasonable appliation of clearly established Federal law.' "" A constitu-
tional error such as presented in this case is deemed to be harmless only if" 'it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contrib-
29. Id
30. Id (citing Nederv. United States, 527 US. 1, 19(1999)). In Naie, the Court stated that
harmless error analysis is appropriate when the defendant is unable to bring forth facts showing that
the jury verdict would have been different if the omitted element was presented and the court is
unable to conclude otherwise. Naier, 527 U.S. at 17, 19.
31. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
32. Esparza, 124 S. Cc. at 11 (quoting Nai'r, 527 U.S. at 11, 13-15 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
33. Id; se Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 n.7 (2002) (stating that in a capital case "[wle
do not reach the State's assertion that anyerror was harmless because a pecuniarygain finding was
implicit in the jury's guiltyverdict"); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,310 (1991) (holding that
in a capital case the admission of an involuntary confession can be subject to harmless-error
analysis); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (stating that unconstitutionally
overbroad jury instructions during the sentencing phase of a capital trial can be analyzed under
harmless error); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,256-59 (1988) (finding that during the sentenc-
ing stage of a capital case admission of evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel can be analyzed under harmless error).
34. Espaza, 124 S. C. at 11.
35. Id
36. Id (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C 5 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
37. Id at 11-12 (alteration in original (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)).
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ute to the verdict obtained.' "38 Granting a habeas petition is only appropriate
if the state court applied harmless-error scrutiny in an" 'objectively unreason-
able' manner."" The Court stated that the Ohio Court of Appeals's determina-
tion was "hardly objectively unreasonable.""' In State v (YIv 41 the Supreme
Court of Ohio defined" 'principal offender' as 'the actual killer.' "42 Moreover,
in Esparza, the trial judge instructed the jury not only as to the elements of
aggravated murder but also "that it must determine 'whether the State has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense of Aggravated Murder was commit-
ted while the Defendant was committing Aggravated Robbery.""' The Supreme
Court concluded that due to these instructions, the juryverdict would have been
the same if the juryhad been instructed additionallyto find that Esparza was the
"principal" actor in the offense." Because the Supreme Court could not find
that the state court's conviction of Esparza of a capital offense was unreasonable,
it was prohibited from setting aside the state court's decision on habeas review."
IV. AVppiatim Vnn
It appears that the law as it is developing, although not yet based on Su-
preme Court precedent, would produce the same result as that in Espavza.
Fourth Circuit precedent- United States v Jacso' " and United State u
Hzp 47- permits aggravating factors to be inferred from the substantive counts
of an indictment.48 In Jaksso, the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
district court that "[w]hile the language of the indictment is not identical to the
38. Id at 12 (quoting Naier, 527 U.S. at 15) (internal quotation marks omitted); sw aso
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (setting forth the harmless-error analysis for
constitutional violations).
39. Esparza, 124 S. Cc. at 12 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003)).
40. Id
41. 709 N.E2d 1166 (Ohio 1999).
42. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. at 12 (quoting State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (Ohio 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
43. Id (quoting Esparza, 310 F.3d at 432 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
44. Id The Court reiterated that Esparza was the only defendant charged in the indictment
and further stated that until the case was heard in federal district court there was no evidence
presented that anyone else was involved in the crime. Id at 12 & n.3.
45. Id at 12.
46. 327 F.3d 273 (4th CAr. 2003).
47. 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cr. 2003).
48. United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 303-04 (4th (Jr. 2003); United States v. Higgs,
353 F.3d 281, 297-98 (4th C(r. 2003); see NMeghan H- Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 221
(2003) (analyzing United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th CAr. 2003)); Maxwell C Smith, Case
Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 499 (2004) (analyzing United States v. Hliggs, 353 F.3d 281 (4th CAr. 2003)).
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language of the notice of intent to seek the death penalty, it contains all the
elements necessary under the federal death penalty to charge a capital crime."49
In Virginia, in contrast to the federal system, the Fifth Amendment cannot
be relied on to require aggravating factors be included in indictments because the
Fifth Amendment has not been applied to the states.5" In Virginia, there is
neither a federal nor a state constitutional right to a grand jury. However,
Virginia Code section 19.2-217 provides in part that "no person shall be put
upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall have first
been found or made by a grand jury." " Therefore, after Ring v Arizona, 2 aggra-
vating factors are elements that must be included in indictments.53 Because of
the statutory language of the Virginia aggravating factors, it is unlikely that the
substance of a count will ever be read in a way that allows a Jadeson inference to
be made. 4
Additionally, capital defense counsel must be aware that, in the absence of
direct Supreme Court precedent, a state court can relyon clearlyestablished non-
capital federal law as indirect authority to deny a petitioner federal habeas relief.
When Supreme Court precedent is "at best, ambiguous," federal courts will be
precluded from overruling a state court's decision because such a decision cannot
be "contraryto" established Supreme Court precedent." Therefore, the absence
of directly controlling precedent is, itself, controlling.
It is also important that Virginia attorneys recognize that a claim based on
the absence of a statutory aggravator in the indictment can be procedurally
defaulted if not raised at trial. The time at which the issue should be raised
involves complex tactical questions. Virginia practitioners are encouraged to
consult the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse when dealing with this issue. 6
49. Jackson, 327 F.3d at 282 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
50. Sw Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment right to presentment or indictment of a grand' does not apply to the states); Benson v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 312,313-14 (Va. 1950) (finding that while the Virginia Code prevents
the trial of a person on a felony charge except upon an indictment found by a grand jury, this is
purely a statutory requirement and is not predicated upon anyconstitutional guarantee); VA. CODE
ANN. 5 19.2-217 (Mlchie 2000) (setting forth the state statutory right to a grand jury for felony
offenses).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217.
52. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
53. Rin 536 U.S. at 609 (standing for the proposition that when a finding of at least one
aggravating factor is necessary for the imposition of the death sentence, that aggravating factor is
an element of the aggravated offense and must be found bya jury as required by the Sixth Amend-
ment).
54. SmMorgan, sr note 48, at 228-31 (providing a more complete explanation of Jadkson);
id at 230 n.84 (explaining a situation in which aJadeson inference could be made in Virginia).
55. EsparA 124 S. Ct. at 11.




Under 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1), a reviewing federal court cannot overturn a
state court decision unless that decision was "contraryto, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law.""7 In the context of a
death verdict in which the indictment failed to allege one element of the offense,
the verdict will survive federal habeas review so long as the jury implicitly found
that element when arriving at its decision. Such an error will be analyzed under
a harmless-error analysis.
Meghan H Morgan
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